1ST AVIATION BATTALION
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION




ANNUAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY
JANUARY 1967





General Interest

Unit Accomplistments

Operation Cedar Falls
Operation Junction City I & II
Operation Manhattan April
Operation Billings
Operation Shenandoah II
Bu Dop Contingency Operations

B Company Commanders



General:

During 1967 the 1st Aviation Battalion completed its second full year of combat in the Republic of Vietnam. The year was highlighted by several changes of command, changing ideas, and concepts, however the basic mission of providing aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division remained. The 1st Aviation Battalion provided the Division Commander with highly responsive and flexible support to assist in the accomplishment of the Division's mission. In the support role the Aviation Battalion performed in all facets of Division operations. The primary missions performed were to provide combat vehicles for command and control, aerial resupply, aerial fire support, aeromedical evacuation, visual and electronic surveillance, and aerial mobility for Division maneuver elements. Elements of the 1st Aviation Battalion could be seen over the operational area of all major operations conducted by the Division during the year.
The 1st Aviation Battalion's internal organization was modified some what from the TO & E in order to functionalize the missions of the companies and facilitate control. A Company (Airmobile light) was authorized 16 UH-1D lift helicopters and 9 UH-1B/C helicopters in an armed helicopter role. A Company's mission was to provide general aviation support to the division by performing courier, resupply, command and liaison, and aerial fire support tasks. B Company (General Support) was authorized 6 Uh-1D lift helicopters, 10 light observations helicopters, and 6 OV-1 surveillance aircraft. B Company's mission centered around providing a highly flexible and mobile command and control capability to the Division Commander, the Assistant Division Commanders and the three Brigade Commanders. In order to insure continuous availability of UH-1D command and control aircraft, four UH-1D helicopters were reassigned from A Company to B Company. The UH-1D's utilized in the command and control role were equipped with three FM radios permitting the commander to maintain communication with his headquarters, his fire support elements and his committed maneuver elements. The commander was able to observe and direct his units while over the action enabling him to increase his span of control and personally influence the wide spread small unit actions that prevail during counter-insurgency operations. The light observation helicopters of B Company were utilized by the Division for convoy control, liaison, and command and control. The Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon of B Company was employed under the operations control of the Division C-2 (air). The ASTA platoon performed visual, electronic and photographic reconnaissance in support of the G-2's intelligence and surveillance plan. The majority of the ASTA Platoon missions were performed at night in order to gather information on the Viet Cong's movements and base areas.


Unit Accomplishments:

The 1st Aviation Battalion was committed in support of Division operations everyday throughout the year. As a result of the continuous involvement the Battalion was listed as a significant contributor to each operation. Probably most significant was the day in - day out support provided, however there are several examples of outstanding services and actions by elements of the Battalion during widely publicized major operations.


Operation Cedar Falls, January 1967:

The 1st Aviation Battalion's participation in Operation Cedar Falls could in a sense be classified as that combat support normally rendered by an aviation unit. However in view of the big air assault operations planned and executed for Cedar Falls in actual case is very much understated. Of particular significance is those operations planned and controlled by the Battalion which were conducted utilizing non-divisional lift resources. Six airmobile operations were planned and directed by the 1st Aviation Battalion using non-organic resources during Cedar Falls. Probably the most significant operation conducted was the airmobile raid on the town of Ben Suc on 8 January 1967. That raid was conducted in 90 sorties utilizing 60 UH-1D aircraft. In addition to five (5) UH-1D and one (1) light fire team from A Company 1st Aviation Battalion, elements of the 68th, 116th, 128th, 162nd, 173rd and 335th Assault Helicopter Companies were under the operational control of the 1st Avn Bn for the Ben Suc raid. The operation was characterized by a simultaneous landing of 60 aircraft in seven landing zones. 30 aircraft were used to execute the second lift to complete the assault on Ben Suc. Timing and execution was faultless throughout the operation. Other operations conducted during Cedar Falls were the seal of Binh My by the 2/16 Infantry on 15 January; extraction of 2/28 Infantry from Ben Suc on 17 January 1967; 2nd Bde operations in the Xom Go Jungle with the 2/28 Infantry on 20 January 1967; 2/28th Infantry insertion northeast of Lai Khe on 23 January and a joint US/ARVN operation vicinity of Chanh Luu on 23 January. All operations were executed without incident. In addition to the airmobile operations conducted by the 1st Aviation Battalion continuous general support missions were performed. The armed helicopters of A Company remained on constant alert and contributed significantly to the success of the operation and defense of Divisional installations throughout the period.


Junction City I & II February, March, April 1967

The 1st Aviation Battalion furnished general aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division throughout Phase I and II of Operation Junction City. The support provided can be further defined as: (a) Planning, coordinating, and executing airmobile assaults with organic and non- divisional aviation assets. (b) Furnishing organic aircraft to units within the division requesting aviation support (ie resupply and command and control) (C&C) aircraft on a daily basis. (c) Providing direct fire support in the form of gunships from the organic armed helicopter platoon.
Dday for Operation Junction City, Phase I, was marked by five (5) battalions conducting airmobile assaults in War Zone "C". In terms of planning this was a joint exercise by Headquarters, 1st Aviation Battalion and Headquarters 11th Aviation Battalion. A joint operations order was written and 60 aircraft were used for the multiple assaults on Dday. As in previous operations of this magnitude, the command and control group of each aviation battalion was used for each separate infantry battalion airmobile assault. The system of alternating control headquarters greatly eased the planning burden and facilitated coordination with the supported headquarters.
Of all airmobile assaults conducted during Operation Junction City, the most noteworthy was the TAC-E received by the 1st Aviation Battalion on 31 March 1967. Approximately 15 minutes after receiving the mission the TAC-E aircraft, scrambled by ASC, started arriving at Lai Khe, the pick up point used for the division RRF (1/16 Infantry). Since aircraft were arriving from all points, aviation unit integrity was forgotten and aircraft were lined up as they arrived from their other missions. In 2 hours and 13 minutes the lift force of 35 aircraft was formed, briefed, troops loaded, and on their way to the battle area, LZ George. The lift force arrived on the scene while the battle of LZ George was still going on. In less than two hours the entire assault element of the 1/16 Infantry was on the ground at LZ George and able to assist the beleaguered force in the most notable of the battles fought during Operation Junction City.
Considerable difficulty was experienced during the airmobile operations conducted as a result of dust and ash in landing zones. The majority of the landing zones selected during Junction City contained either tall grass or dried out shrubbery, highly susceptible to burning, and imposing a significant threat to the proposed operation if a fire was ignited during the artillery and TAC air preparation. Perhaps the most pressing problem that presented itself during Junction City was the question as to whether or not to burn the LZ prior to conducting airmobile assaults into them. If the decision was made to "pre-burn" the LZ the problem of tipping one's hand presented itself. This was solved to some extent by setting fire to as many potential LZ's through out the area as possible. The technique of pre-burning has now been established as policy and is started early in the dry season in all potential areas of operation to preclude compromise and permit the reestablishment of new grass to help hold the topsoil in place. The dust and ash hazard as a result of the burning must be accepted and considered in planning. Formations must be loose, spacing between flights must be increased and the number of aircraft permitted in the LZ at one time must be reduced.
Significant support to the success of Operation Junction City was not limited to the wide spread airmobile operations. The Bulldogs and Longhorns performing general support missions also made their presence felt. During the night of 10 to 11 March 1967 a Rebel light fire team and five UH-1D's conducted resupply operations in support of the2/2 Infantry (Mechanized) and 2/33 Artillery at Fire Support Bases I and II while those units were heavily engaged with the Viet Cong 272nd Regiment. A total of 16 tons of ammunition was air lifted into the beleaguered units under intense fire. This rapid resupply of ammunition materially assisted the 2/2 Infantry and 2/33 Artillery in establishing fire superiority and routing the Viet Cong from the battlefield.
On 20 March 1967 the Bulldogs and Longhorns again rose to the occasion to support a defeat in detail of Viet Cong forces. A light fire team and resupply aircraft of A Company 1st Aviation Battalion and Command and Control aircraft of B Company responded to the assistance of the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry at Bau Bang. One ton of ammunition was delivered under fire to the unit while the Rebel fire team delivered accurate suppressive, fire that undoubtedly accounted for many of the more than 200 Viet Cong killed in the battle. First Lieutenant Michael S. Glynn of B Company 1st Aviation Battalion was awarded the Silver Star for his acts during that battle. Lt. Glynn conducted a low level reconnaissance to determine the disposition and size of the enemy force. During the course of his reconnaissance his aircraft became the target of intense Viet Cong fire and was hit several times, destroying the aircraft's radio. Lt. Blynn landed his aircraft and ran to the friendly position under heavy enemy fire in order to deliver the information gained on his reconnaissance. On his return to the aircraft Lt. Glynn found that his aircraft, passenger, and crew were being fired upon by several well concealed Viet Cong on the edge of the jungle. Lt. Glynn moved in the jungle, out flanked the enemy and single handedly neutralized the enemy. Lt. Glynn returned to his aircraft and continued to direct fire on the enemy until they were completely routed from the area.
Though essentially in a general support role the battalion was there everyday supporting the division.


Operation Manhattan April, May 1967

The 1st Aviation Battalion participated in four airmobile operations during Operation Manhattan. The primary effort by the Battalion was in the General support role. However, the role of the armed helicopter as a fire support weapon continued to gain importance. Rebel light fire teams were maintained on a continuous five minute reaction standby to respond to the needs of the ground commander.


Operation Billings June 1967

During Operation Billings the 1st Aviation Battalion demonstrated the flexibility inherent to Army Aviation during TAC-E airmobile assault. The lift force to be used to conduct the operation was assembled in one hour and forty five minutes after the TAC-E was declared. Approximately midway to the original destination the landing zone was changed. Flights were briefed in the air, fire support coordination was made, flight routes were designated and final coordination made with ease through the multi-communications inherent to the aircraft. The operation was further complicated due to interruptions by enemy mortar fire in the LZ. Despite the diversion and enemy actions the operation was conducted in a most expeditions and professional manner and was accomplished in short order without incident.


Operation Shenandoah II October - November 1967

The second half of 1967 found a general decrease in the number of large airmobile operations and a resultant decrease in the involvement of the 1st Aviation Battalion. Battalion missions centered around providing Command and Control aircraft, performing resupply, medical evacuation, aerial fire support, employment of the Pathfinder Detachment at forward airstrips and over all supervision of division aviation activities.
On 17 October 1967 LTC Paul B. Malone III Battalion Commander 1st Aviation Battalion was designated air mission commander to conduct the extraction of numerous dead and wounded of the 2/28th Infantry after a major engagement with a battalion of the Viet Cong 271st Regiment. Due to the heavy jungle canopy early extraction efforts were confined to the use of hoist and jungle penetrator equipped aircraft. The relief force succeeded in cutting out a small opening in the jungle which has since become known as the "hole". Several OH-13 aircraft from the aviation sections of the 1st Brigade and Division Artillery were used to extract wounded. Later the "hole" was enlarged and UH-1D helicopters were able to make the 100 foot vertical descent to the ground to evacuate the wounded. LTC Malone requested additional UH-1D aircraft and continued with the resources at hand. The last wounded man was extracted on the last available aircraft. Only the dead remained. LTC Malone without regard for his own personal safety elected to begin evacuation of the dead to a near by NDF with his heavily loaded C&C aircraft while awaiting the arrival of the additional aircraft he had requested. On approach to the "hole" LTC Malone's aircraft became the target of intense automatic weapons fire. At that time LTC Malone's aircraft was hit six (6) times and he was seriously wounded. At that time LTC Malone was evacuated to the hospital. The evacuation of the dead continued with aircraft of the 1st Aviation Battalion and the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company. Sporadic fire was received until the mission was terminated by darkness. One other aircraft was hit by ground fire during the operation. LTC Malone was later evacuated to CONUS as a result of his wounds.
As the battle shifted from the area northwest of Lai Khe to Loc Ninh the importance of the Armed helicopter again came to light. The "Rebels" of A Co. 1st Aviation Battalion were employed nightly between 29 October and 6 November in support of ARVN, Special Forces, and 1st Infantry Division units heavily engaged with elements of three (3) Viet Cong Regiments in and around the Loc Ninh rubber plantation complex. They were continuously exposed to heavy anti- aircraft machine gun fire but continued their support and were given credit on three occasions for preventing the VC from overrunning friendly positions. During the battle at Loc Ninh the "Rebels" once again proved themselves as a most effective and responsive fire support asset, particularly during night operations.
It became apparent early during the battle at Loc Ninh that the facilities at Quan Loi were going to be severely over taxed to support the rapid buildup of supplies, personnel, and equipment.
The Pathfinder Detachment of the 1st Aviation Battalion was taken to Quan Loi to assist in airfield control. Later in the operation the Pathfinders were moved to Loc Ninh to control that airfield. The high density of fixed and rotary wing traffic required that landing priorities be established and controlled by an officer stationed in the tower. On several occasions USAF cargo aircraft had to be held for as much as one hour when higher priority airmobile operations were being staged off the air fields. The efforts of the Pathfinders in controlling aircraft and coordinating with artillery units on the airfield succeeded in expediting the flow of materials and supplies and insuring safe airfield operations.


Bu Dop Contingency Operations November and December 1967

The last major operation the 1st Infantry Division conducted in 1967 was in support of ARVN forces at Bu Dop. Elements of the Viet Cong 9th Division attacked the district Headquarters at Bu Dop and threatened to gain control of the area. The first assistance sent to the ARVN forces at Bu Dop by the First Infantry Division was light fire teams from A Company, 1st Aviation Battalion which scrambled in response to the initial Viet Cong attacks. "Rebel" light fire teams were on station nightly in the Bu Dop area in response to Viet Cong initiated attacks. The Bu Dop operations brought the first extensive use of the OV-1's of the ASTA Platoon in a visual reconnaissance role. B Company's "Hawks" conducted daily visual reconnaissance flights of the Bu Dop border areas and known suspected infiltration routes. The data collected by the Hawks in the VR role and by the routinely scheduled electronic surveillance mission materially assisted the G-2 in the detection of Viet Cong base areas infiltration routes, the selection of target for H & I firers and the targeting of B-52 strikes.
The elements of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division moved into the Bu Dop area were entirely dependent upon an air line of communication. All resupply was lifted into the Bu Dop area either by USAF cargo aircraft or by Army helicopters. Elements of the 1st Pathfinder Detachment were moved into Bu Dop Airstrip to provide for traffic control and artillery advisors. The Pathfinders task was made more difficult as a result of periodic Viet Cong mortar attacks on the airfield. Two Pathfinders received minor wounds during the operation. All Pathfinders participating in the operation were awarded the Combat Infantry Badge for their efforts in resisting the repeated Viet Cong attacks.
The efforts of the 1st Aviation Battalion were not limited to the major named operations indicated above. As previously stated the 1st Aviation Battalion was "Above the First" everyday of 1967 providing outstanding contributions to the accomplishments of the 1st Infantry Division.


B Company Commanders during CY-1967

Major William L. HindmanBeginning of period to 1 Feb 67
Major Dale E. Dobson1 Feb 67 to 1 Aug 67
Major Harold L. Anderson1 Aug 67 to end of period




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Credits

This history has been retracted, in its entirety, from the United States National Archives, Washington, D.C. (U. S. Government publication, no copyright applicable).


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Last update: July 30, 1997