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Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) - Home PageSource:
Office of the Command Historian
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia
Credits
The AO-1 MOHAWK fixed wing observation airplane was originally developed to meet joint Army and Marine Corps requirements. The Marines withdrew from the project before the first flight, leaving the Army to continue development alone. The requirement was for an aircraft capable of rough field operation with short take-off performance and equipped for tactical observation and battlefield surveillance missions.
The first Army contract - placed in 1957 through Navy Bureau of Aeronautics which administered the program on behalf of the Army - was for nine test items, designated as the YAO-1AF. The first flight took place in April 1959. Later that year, the Army contracted for thirty-five production model MOHAWKs to be used for the test, training, and assignment to high priority units. The order was later increased to a total of seventy-seven airplanes, to be delivered in three models. First were thirty- six AO-1AFs, with a KA-30 camera in the fuselage, which could be rotated from the cockpit to left or right oblique positions. Upward ejecting flares were carried for night photography, with 104 flares mounted in two pods. The AO-1BF was similar, but carried side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) in a long external pod, This equipment provided a permanent radar photographic map of the ground on each side of the flight path, with a developed photograph available in the cockpit within seconds of the film being exposed. Seventeen of the first seventy-seven MOHAWKS were ordered as AO-1BF models; tech first flew in 1960. The third MOHAWK series was the AO-1CF, of which twenty-four were ordered from the initial contracts. This model differed from the AO-1AF only in having UAS-4 infrared mapping equipment.
On 25 October 1960, an interim report was submitted based upon the Army Aviation Board's participation in the Navy trials and approximately 200 hours of flight time at Fort Rucker. The report recommended that the distribution of AO-1 airplanes be limited to CONUS activities pending the correction of discrepancies described in the report. CONARC concluded in June 1961 that the AO-1 was suitable for Army use as a combat surveillance airplane, provided that appropriate engines were furnished and the deficiencies and shortcomings disclosed by the service test were corrected. CONARC recommended that action be taken to extend the service life and improve the reliability of the T-53 turbine engine.
Planning for MOHAWK training began even before the first aircraft flew. In July 1958, Brig. Gen. Ernest F. Easterbrook, the Director of Army Aviation, requested that CONARC prepare plans for specialized training. On 7 October, CONARC submitted a plan for initiating training for operational and maintenance personnel and recommendations on actions required by the Department of the Army. Personnel to support the test activities and initiate school training on the MOHAWK would be given specialized training by Grumman and Lycoming on a contract basis.
Before attending these factory training courses, pilots had to undergo indoctrination training in high altitude flying and ejection seat operation. Because the Army did not have the capability to conduct this training, CONARC recommended that arrangements be made with the Air Force or the Navy to provide this type of training for Army personnel.
Major problems developed as a result of the multiplicity of systems involved in the MOHAWK and delays in qualification and production of acceptable turbine engines, radar and infrared surveillance sensors, photographic systems, and ground support equipment. CONARC crew training was originally scheduled to begin in May 1960, but slippage in the availability of aircraft required repeated rescheduling. As a result, training did not start until April 1961. CONARC representatives attended systems management meetings at the Department of the Army on 24 August and 15 November 1960 in order to coordinate corrective actions with all agencies involved.
Forty MOHAWKs had been produced by the end of FY 1961; two were issued to the Army Aviation School, the balance were involved in tests or were at the Grumman plant awaiting the results of tests to establish a firm electronic configuration. Ground support equipment generally was not in existence or was in short supply. Small items, such as oxygen masks and attachments, photographic flares, and ejection seat cartridges, had not been programmed. during the year, actions continued in the development of a distribution schedule for the AO-1 to CONUS and overseas commands. Problems centered around the establishment of pipeline support of spare parts to overseas areas and CONUS posts for the airframe, engine, the new camera, signal electronics, and avionics equipment.
Because of the numerous deficiencies, CONARC conducted an additional series of confirmatory tests on the MOHAWK which disclosed that not all the problems previously reported had been corrected. On 26 March 1962, CONARC recommended that corrective action be taken. The problems, however, did not prevent the deployment of the first AO-1s to Vietnam. During FY 1962, the department of the Army developed a surveillance concept using armed AO-1s. In addition to their normal surveillance mission, the aircraft were armed and capable of attacking ground targets or could be used to provide close air support. The use of the MOHAWK in this role was to cause serious problems with the Air Force in the following years. The 23rd Special Warfare Aviation Detachment was equipped with the armed MOHAWK and deployed to Vietnam during FY 1962.
Even as the MOHAWK entered service, the Army began development of the next generation of observation aircraft. In September 1961, CONARC began active participation in the development of a new manned surveillance aircraft by designating a representative to the U.S. Army Transportation Research Command System Phasing Group which was conducting the research on the project. The objective of the group was to provide and coordinate the essential elements of information for defining the technical and operational characteristics of the aircraft configuration. The group findings would be provided as input into an Office of the Chief of Research and Development study being done by Canadair on survivability of the manned surveillance aircraft. This type aircraft had been recommend for development by the Rogers Board. In December, the Department of the Army directed CONARC to furnish a member of the Project Advisory Group for the new surveillance aircraft. The group would provide advisory and coordinating functions with respect to the overall objectives of the Systems Phasing Group.
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Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) - Home PageNo restricted and/or classified information is contained herein. This home page and web site have been constructed and will be maintained entirely by the author, and the author is responsible for the contents and accuracy of this site. The contents of this page have not been reviewed, approved, or monitored by the United States Army, nor is this page and/or it's contents a representation of such. All comments, questions, and concerns should be directed to the author - John E. Akers
The proceeding story has been retracted from - TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, "A HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION - 1950-1962" (U. S. Goverment publication, no copyright applicable).
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