The Mohawk in Vietnam

Chapter II - The Early Years in Vietnam, 1961-1965

The Mohawk in Vietnam

Since I discussed earlier the controversial aspects of the Mohawk in its relation to the Army-Air Force roles and missions issues, it is important to review its actual performance in Vietnam in 1962. The six armed Mohawks did a magnificent job and many Army advisors pleaded for more of the same. The missions performed by these aircraft during this period were somewhat tangential to the story of airmobility in the Army. However, this does not take anything away from the individual accomplishments of the Mohawk pilots.

After a storm of controversy in the Pentagon, the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment was deployed to Vietnam in September 1962 for the purpose of providing air surveillance in support of Republic of Vietnam forces. In addition, they were to serve as a test unit for operational evaluation conducted by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam. The 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment (Surveillance) was organized in July 1962 as a prototype armed aerial surveillance unit using the OV-1 Mohawk aircraft. Besides its headquarters and photo processing section, there were three flight teams, each consisting of two armed Mohawks, four pilots, and seven enlisted maintenance and armament specialists.

When they were deployed to Vietnam their rules of employment specified that: on all operational flights a Vietnamese observer would be aboard; that the aircraft would be armed with .50 caliber weapons only; and, that this armament would be used only when required to defend against a hostile attack. The 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment was assigned to Support Group, Vietnam for administration and logistical support. Operational control remained with Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, who decided to place the Mohawks in support of II Army of the Republic of Vietnam Corps. From 16 October to 22 November the entire unit was stationed at Nha Trang supporting the 9th Division and the Railway Security Agency. On 23 November one flight team was moved to Qui Nhon, 100 miles north of Hha Trang, to be closer to the 9th Division.

The plan of test for the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment called for systematic surveillance of a sector that would insure an even distribution of effort over a selected tactical area. However, it soon became abundantly clear that the supported units were generating so many missions for specific reconnaissance sorties within their tactical areas that no other missions could be flown. In each area, an element of the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment was employed under the direction of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam commander, through his U. S. advisor, as an integral part of the total available force. Because of the many variables involved, the specific contribution of the Mohawk to the reduction of Viet Cong incidents could not be quantified. But, there was no question that the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment inhibited and restricted Viet Cong Activity.

Visual and photographic reconnaissance by this twin-turbine airplane produced a wealth of intelligence for supported units. Hundreds of structures, most of them camouflaged, were detected in Viet Cong base areas. Likewise, hundreds of people were sighted in suspect areas and, because of the detailed familiarity of Mohawk crews with the local situation and activity patterns, some of the people sighted could be positively identified as insurgents. One of the unique advantages of the Mohawk in reconnaissance was its speed to noise relationship which allowed the aircraft to get within observation distance of people on the ground without altering them to its presence. In one division, artillery fires directed from the air were nearly tripled by the activities of Mohawk observers. Supported units quickly developed air to ground procedures to exploit the capabilities of the immediately available Special Warfare Aviation Detachment aircraft.

From 16 October 1962 to 15 March 1963 the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment flew more than 2,000 hours in the performance of 785 combat support missions. It had delivered defensive fire 27 times and had lost two aircraft. The cause of the loss of these two aircraft was never determined.

Many of the U. S. Army advisors wrote glowing reports of the Mohawk pilots and urged Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to relax the rules of engagement. For example, on 23 March 1963 the Senior advisor of the II Corps Tactical Zone, Colonel Hal D. McCown, wrote:

. . . Two Mohawk aircraft are constantly based at Quang Ngai airfield for close and immediate support of the 25th Infantry Division. Results of Mohawk operations there thus far include the following:

a. Rapid production of low level aerial photographs of VC troop dispositions and installations as well as photographic coverage of prospective operational areas of the 25th Infantry Division.

b. A large volume of combat intelligence has been produced by visual sightings of troops in the open including weapon emplacements.

c. A bonus effect has been obtained from the defensive machine gun fire put down by the Mohawks when fired upon. Some VC casualties have been observed from these fires.

d. During the period 15 February to 8 March, artillery adjustment by Mohawk observers on VC troops sighted accounted for an estimated 65 enemy casualties. Combining these casualties with those noted in subparagraph c above, it is concluded that the Mohawk has either directly or indirectly caused more VC casualties during this period than all other military forces in Quang Ngai, including RVNAF air strikes.

Furthermore, I consider that the attack by the well equipped Q 95 VC Battalion in the Bato area on 3 March was relatively impotent. This was most probably due to actions by Mohawk aircraft on the days immediately preceding the attack. These aircraft were responsible for sighting and adjusting fire on large groups of armed VC within a few thousand meters of the scene of the attack.

Despite this fine performance, the full potential of the Mohawk aircraft cannot be realized because of the present test restrictions. I refer to the limitation of armament to the .50 cal machine guns.

The Mohawk aircraft consistently locate remunerative targets which are beyond the range of friendly artillery. The majority of these targets are small bodies of troops in the open. In counter-insurgency operations this is the type target most likely to be encountered. These are fleeting targets, and unless immediately engaged, will disperse and disappear. They are long gone before a friendly air strike can be mounted.

On the several occasions that the Mohawk has encountered and returned ground fire, the aircraft limitation to .50 cal machine guns has considerably curtailed the effectiveness of this defensive response. It is apparent that the addition of rockets, napalm and small fragmentation bombs would have greatly increased the number of VC casualties inflicted during the past few weeks. Further, this vastly increased fire-power capability would have a profound impact on the Vc ability to conduct daylight troop movements. This would seriously hinder their tactical initiative, especially in Quang Ngai Province. It is also believed that this increased defensive firepower would enhance the surveillance capability of the aircraft by allowing greater low level freedom of movement.

In another letter, dated 19 March 1963, the Senior Advisor of the 25th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division, Colonel Paul A. Baldy, echoed many of Colonel McCown's remarks and added his own list of impressive data. He closed his letter with the following:

It is my considered opinion that the Mohawks' success can be attributed to their immediate responsiveness to the commanders. In a counter-insurgency operation such as we have in Vietnam with its fleeting and elusive targets, the immediate and direct control over an aircraft as swift, silent and well-equipped as the Mohawk, flown by pilots with intimate knowledge of the terrain and current enemy situation, is an invaluable asset to a commander.

Similar letters of praise came from the 9th Infantry Division advisors and the senior railway security advisor. In the case of railway security, enemy attacks decreased by 50 percent after regular surveillance was begun by the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment. Nevertheless, the career of a railway engineer in Vietnam was considered to be non-habit forming.

There is no doubt that the Mohawks filled a real intelligence need for the U. S. Army advisors in the field. For the first time the advisors found themselves with a responsive tool in the form of the Mohawk under their direct operational control to fill in the many gaps in their intelligence. Their requests for aerial surveillance and fighter strikes through the cumbersome channels to the Vietnamese Air Force no doubt increased their desire for more Mohawk support. As can be seen from the above, there was the inevitable trend to use the Mohawk in the fighter role, mainly because it was there and it had the hard points necessary to carry armament.

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No restricted and/or classified information is contained herein. This home page and web site have been constructed and will be maintained entirely by the author, and the author is responsible for the contents and accuracy of this site. The contents of this page have not been reviewed, approved, or monitored by the United States Army, nor is this page and/or it's contents a representation of such. All comments, questions, and concerns should be directed to the author - John E. Akers

Credits

The proceeding story has been retracted from - VIETNAM STUDIES; AIRMOBILITY 1961-1971; DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; pg 40-44; Chapter II - The Early Years in Vietnam, 1961-1965 (U. S. Goverment publication, no copyright applicable).

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Last update: January 27, 2002